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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF JOB OPENINGS AVAILABLE TO MR.
COLBURN UTILIZING HIS SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE. IF THE
COURT IMPUTES INCOME TO MR. COLBURN IT SHOULD BE CALCULATED
AT $23,000 WHICH IS THE HIGHEST JOB OFFER RECEIVED OR
$26,600 WHICH IS THE SALARY FOR STARTING FINANCIAL PLANNERS.
Both briefs filed in this action cite Hall v. Hall, 858 P. 2d 1018
(Utah App. 1993) for the legal principal that a finding of voluntary
underemployment must be based on Mr. Colburn's abilities, employment
capacity, earning potential and possible job openings available. Mrs.
Romboy testified that Mr. Colburn had abilities and skills that could
be transferred to employment as either a public relations manager or
management consultant.

However, there was no testimony presented at

trial that there were job openings available
fields.

in either of these

Further, it is mere conjecture that Mr. Colburn who was

fifty-one years of age and without experience in these areas could
land a job in either public relations or management consulting.
A review of Respondent's brief gives an inaccurate and distorted
picture of the efforts made by Mr. Colburn to secure employment after
being forced to resign from Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters.
There are a number of representations that are either taken out of
context or do not provide a complete picture.

Paragraph

12 of

Respondent's Statement of Facts provides:
12.
After resigning from Southern Marine and Aviation
Underwriters, Defendant contacted three (3) or four (4)
individuals, and attended one (1) interviews seeking
employment. (Tr. 39, 94)
Page 39 of the transcript relied on for the foregoing paragraph
provides:

Q (By Mr. Anderson) To the best of your knowledge did he
attempt to find full-time employment after resigning from
Southern Marine and Aviation?
A (Mrs. Colburn) Well, he initially made some calls around
the country. We took sort of a driving vacation in the
southeast and he went to Atlanta, talked with a company
there, but to my knowledge that's the only actual interview
he had. And he had it in his mind that he really wasn't
going to work, he was going to start his own business.
Mrs. Colburn's self-serving testimony completely ignores the
testimony of Mr. Colburn that he spent months seeking employment both
in and outside of the aviation insurance industry.

Mr. Colburn

testified he contacted head hunters, all of his previous contacts and
six or seven companies within the aviation industry and there were no
employment offers for senior aviation insurance underwriters. (Tr.
93,96,97; R.212 f 8 FOF).
Page 94 of the transcript is also relied on to support paragraph
12 of Respondent's Statement of Facts.

On page 94 there is a

reference to three or four individuals Mr. Colburn contacted that had
contacts with reinsurance treaties. As set forth above, these people
are not the only individuals contacted by Mr. Colburn for employment.
Paragraph 13 of Mrs. Colburn's Statement of Facts provides:
13. Defendant declined to seek employment in other areas
of the insurance business, and turned down two (2) job
offers. (Tr. 98).
Mr. Colburn sought employment in areas other than aviation
insurance or he would have not contacted the Marine division of
Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters or New York Life and I.D.S.
for employment.

The two job offers turned down were $13,000 a year

for New York Life and $23,000 per year for I.D.S.. (Tr. 90,98; R. 212
f 8 FOF).
2

Paragraph 14 of Respondent's Statement of Facts states:
14. Defendant declined to seek employment outside of his
specific areas of expertise in the aviation insurance
industry, desiring instead to start his own business as a
financial planner in Park City. (Tr. 98,99,100,101).
As set forth above, Mr. Colburn sought employment outside of the
aviation insurance industry.

There were areas of employment he did

not consider for various reasons. He did not consider the automobile
insurance business because he would have to learn a whole new trade
and in the long term he could make more money as a financial planner.
He did not consider becoming a pilot because he had not flown an
airplane for fifteen years and he was not aware of any jobs other than
flying co-pilot which would earn less than $20,000 per year. (Tr. 98101) .
Paragraph 18 in Respondent's Statement of Facts provides:
18. Defendant was requested by the President of VEMCO to
head up its commercial department. (Tr. 180).
Page 180 of the Transcript provides:
Q (by Mr. Anderson) You stated when you were let go from
National Underwriters that you weren't— you couldn't find
another position. Isn't it true that you were offered a
position with VEMCO in Frederick, Maryland?
A (Mr. Colburn) Yeah, but I don't think — the chairman
just said that he wanted me to head up the commercial
department, which was going backwards, and it was just
something he said I think to appease me.
There was no
actual job offer. (Emphasis added).
Paragraph 19 of Mrs. Colburn's Statement of Facts provides:
19.
Defendant testified that he did not look for
employment in other areas of the insurance industry because
he was tired of getting bumped out of the corporate jobs.
(Tr. 180).
Mr. Colburn looked for employment in aviation and other areas of
3

the insurance industry.

Mr. Colburn did testify he was "tired of

getting bumped out of these corporate jobs". However, this statement
refers to his being terminated as an aviation insurance executive with
both National Aviation Underwriters and Southern Marine and Aviation
Underwriters. It does not mean Mr. Colburn wasn't attempting to seek
other employment.
The body of Respondent's Brief also distorts the facts of the
case.

Page 22 and 23 of Respondent's brief provides:

The similarity between the facts in Hill and the case at
bar are striking. In justifying his decision to become a
self-employed financial planner earning $260.00 per month,
Defendant continually asserted he chose to do so because
that is where his education and interests lie. (Tr. 180).
This choice was made at the expense of the opportunity to
make a higher salary in a job less related to his expressed
desire to become a fee-only financial planner. While Mr.
Colburn is free to make such a personal decision, in light
of the ruling in Hill, his personal preferences should not
undermine his obligations to support Mrs. Colburn.
In Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah App. 1993), the husband quit
his job at Morton Thiokol and obtained employment in Utah County at
a substantial decrease in salary.

Mr. Colburn did not quit his

employment with either National Aviation Underwriters or Southern
Marine and Aviation Underwriters. He was terminated by both employers
as a result of the contracting aviation industry.

Mr. Colburn chose

to become a certified financial planner (CFP) because there were no
jobs available in aviation insurance and he felt financial planning
provided the best long-term employment prospects available.
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, Mr. Colburn's
position as set forth in Appellant's Brief

is that he is not

voluntarily underemployed and the court pursuant to Section 78-454

7.5(7) (a) is not authorized to impute income.
court determir

*

However, should the

ome should be i mpti! "' I ti'i 'In1 purposes of

calculating alimony, the court should use $23,000 per year which is
the highest job offer received by Mr. Colburn, or $10.00 per hour
(approximately $21, 0 0 0 per year) based < ::n I ! l:t

:::' : •] 1: u n i i f s testimony that

he could earn $10.00 per year working for another financial planner.
(Tr.

156)

The maximum amount of income the court is justified in

imput ing

test imony o f Co i :ii i i e Romboy i s

$26,600 per year which is her testimony of the salary for a beginning
financial planner in the State of Utah. (Tr. 128).
POINT II.
THE ALIMONY AWARD TO MRS. COLBURN CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHETHER OR NOT INCOME IS IMPUTED TO MR. COLBURN
BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN UNEQUAL POST-DIVORCE LIVING STANDARDS.
As set forth in Point II of Appellant's Brief, alimony should
seek to the extent possible I: : eqi la ] i ze the parties1 respective postdivorce

living

standards.

However, alimony

may

only

raise

the

standard of living of the receiving spouse unti] it is roughly equal
I
App.

I In ill 'it I IIH 11 in

HI s p o u s e .

Rasband v . R a s b a n d . 7 5 2 P. 2d 1 3 3 1 (Utah

1988), Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App 1991)

The

alimony award in this case results in disproportionate standards of
living

I i Ml i | i.nr I; I < »S nven

if Mi, Colburn is imputed

income at

$40,000 per year.
Both parties agree that Mrs. Colburn has gross monthly resources
of $4,729

Colburn claims that using $40,0™

year or $3,333.33 per month in imputed income, his gross monthly
available resources are $4,764.43.
5

This amount is calculateci as

follows:
Amount

Description

$3,333.33
1,125.00
306.10
$4,764.43

Imputed Income
Non-IRA earnings
ULTRA earnings
TOTAL

In Respondent's Brief it is alleged that Mr. Colburn has gross
monthly resources of $5,028.43 which is $264.00 more than that claimed
by Mr. Colburn. The $264.00 difference is assumed to be Mr. Colburn's
earnings from Summit Financial Advisors Group. It is clearly improper
to add the $264.00 per month actual earnings to the $3,333.33 imputed
income. Accordingly, Mrs. Colburn's actual monthly resources is only
$35.00 less than Mr. Colburnfs monthly resources using imputed monthly
earnings of $3,333.33.
While the parties resources using imputed income for Mr. Colburn
are similar, there is a tremendous disparity in the standard of living
of the parties as evidenced by their claimed expenses. Mrs. Colburn's
expenses

total

$3,906.30

whereas

Mr.

Colburn's

expenses

total

$2,179.00 per month which includes a $704.00 child support obligation.
When child support is factored out, Mr. Colburn lives on $1,475.00 per
month.
A comparison of some of the expenses of the parties clearly
establishes the disproportionate living standards:

6

Expense

Mrs. Colburn

Mr. Colburn

Rent or Mortgage payment
Food & household supplies
Entertainment
Auto expense

$1,500
$ 600
$ 600
$ 200

$400
$2 00
$2 00
$150

School

$

$0

350

the five it*Mir IHT tru In ibmi , iu i.

i DM MI s expenses are

$2,300.00 more than Mr. Colburn. These expenses reflect a substantial
difference

in

standard

of

living

entertainment and educat

relating

to

housing,

food,

ire is oi LI y a $50 difference in

auto expense, it should be noted that Mr. Colburn's auto expenses are
less for his 1982 Volvo than Mrs. Colburn incurs for her 1993 Subaru.
While Mrs. Colburnfs living expenses she 1i1d be somewhat higher
inasmuch as she is the custodial parent for the two minor children,
there is no justification for a discrepancy in living expenses of
$2,431.

I Itrther, as noted in footnote 4

Respondent's Brief,

the parties' oldest child attained 18 years of age and graduated from
high

school

in June, 1995 which

further

reduces Mrs.

colburn's

househo1d expense.
Respondent argues that with $3,3 30 imputed monthly income to Mr.
Colburn, he is able to pay his expenses, including alimony, ai

I

maintain aboi I he same positive cash flow as Mrs. Colburn ($1,849.43
vs. $1,823.00).

This argument fails to take into consideration that

Mr. Colburn's ability to generate gross monthly income as calculated
by Respondent
parties is not equal,

the standard of living of the
Mr. Colburn should not be penalized nor Mrs.

Colburn rewarded because Mr. Colburn's living expenses are $2,431.30
I >e. i lie )i I t .1 ( $3,906.30 less $1,475) less than Mrs. Colburn's,
7

Further,

if Mr. Colburn is imputed income at $26,600 year or $2,217 per month
(see Point I, supra), his gross monthly imputed resources of $3,648
are $1,081 less than Mrs. Colburn1s actual gross monthly resources
exclusive of alimony.
Respondent's Brief indicates that Mrs. Colburn's monthly expenses
"did not include amounts normally used for regular savings and family
vacations, which had been substantial in the past."

Mr. Colburn's

expenses also do not include regular savings or vacations.
taking

into

consideration

the alimony

award, Mr.

Without

Colburn

has a

negative cash flow of $484.00 per month while Mrs. Colburn has a
positive cash flow of $823.00 per month.

Mrs. Colburn also argues

that her positive cash flow of $823.00 per month completely ignores
all tax consequences and her regular taxes and deductions consume her
positive cash flow.

If the court takes into consideration taxes, it

should consider tax consequences to both parties.
page

20

of

$80,311.58
$3,179.00

Appellant's
per

year

Brief, Mr. Colburn

just

to

meet

his

As set forth on

is required

financial

to

earn

obligations

of

(includes alimony) per month when taxes are taken into

consideration.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROVIDED SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO CALCULATE MR. COLBURN'S RETIREMENT
BENEFITS UNDER THE NAVY POINT SYSTEM. THE NAVY
POINT SYSTEM IS CONSISTENT WITH WOODWARD.
In Respondent's

Brief

it is alleged

there was

insufficient

evidence presented at trial for the court to determine that the true
value of Mr. Colburn's retirement is measured by the Navy point system
and the court was without a reliable means of determining how to
8

translate the accrued points into a set monetary value. This position
fails

onsideration the

rt's

admission of Exhibit 2 0

and receipt of a copy of In Re Marriage of Poppe, 97 Cal.App.3d 1, 158
Cal.Rptr. 500 (1979).

With respect to admission of Exhibit 20, the

transcript j: ro1 ni • ies :
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:
20.

We would renew our admission for Exhibit

THE COURT: All right. I am going to allow admission of D20 and as to what weight would be my determination
regarding whether— what weight and to the applicable law
in effect. (Tr. 117)
During closing arguments, the navy point system and the Poppe
decision were specifically argued

(Tr. 212-214).

Mr, Colburn's

counsel argued * part as follows:
Now the benefits accrued during the marriage in terms of
Navy retirement are the points that Mr. Colburn receives
from the U.S. Navy.
And those points are set forth on
Exhibit 20, a letter from the U.S. Navy. And she [Mrs.
Colburn] is certainly entitled to one-half of the benefits
that Mr. Colburn receives for retirement during the 21-year
marriage.
Now the fact of it is he was on active duty before their
marriage and she is not entitled to those points, based
upon the Poppe decision I provided to the Court. I don't
find anything, you Honor, inconsistent with Poppe and
Woodward.
If evidence

regarding

the naval point

system

had

not

been

introduced at trial, Mrs. Colburn1s attorney would certainly have
objected to the foregoing argument am

/e

allowed the same.
Application of the naval point system is consistent with
' ' \ 1982)-

Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P. 2d 43

Woodward speci fi caJ ] y

provides with respect to retirement benefits that "to the extent that
9

the right has so accrued it is subject to equitable distribution".
656 P. 2d at 433.

Over sixty percent of Mr. Colburn's retirement

benefits accrued prior to marriage when Mr. Colburn was on active
duty. Accordingly, Mrs. Colburn is not entitled to the benefits which
Mr. Colburn accrued prior to marriage.

Based on the evidence

presented during trial, Mrs. Colburn's retirement award is computed
by multiplying one-half times the fraction 939/2409 times the amount
of the pension or 19.5% of Mr. Colburn's Navy retirement.

This

information was available to the trial court and is consistent with
the Woodward decision.
POINT IV
MR. COLBURN HAS SATISFACTORILY MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE
RELATING TO THE ISSUE OF VOLUNTARY UNDEREMPLOYMENT.
Point I of Respondent's Brief contends that Mr. Colburn has
failed to satisfactorily marshall the evidence relating to the issue
of voluntarily underemployment.

Specifically, it is alleged that

there was a failure to marshall the evidence in the following areas:
(1) Omission of Mr. Colburn's position as a high level
executive during most of his career, serving as President
and C.E.O. National Aviation Underwriters from 1986 through
1988 and Vice-President Southern Marine Aviation and
Underwriters from 1988 through 1992;
(2) Failure to note Connie Romboy's testimony that it is
essential to look at the transferability and marketability
of skills obtained as a result of defendant's employment as
a high level executive to accurately determine what he
might make in the current labor market;
(3) Failure to note that Mr. Colburn declined to accept
employment outside of the aviation insurance industry and
that he was asked to head of the commercial department of
VEMCO; and,
(4) Failure to refer to evidence of career possibilities
that exist outside of operating his own business including
employment as a pilot and other opportunities inside the
field of financial planning.
10

A careful review of Mr. Colburn's Brief reflects that each of the
foregoing alleged omissions were addressed in Appellant's brief.
Past Employment. Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the Statement of Facts
in Appellant's Brief clearly set forth that Mr. Colburn worked for
National Aviation Underwriters from 1971 through February, 1988 and
Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters from May, 1988 until 1992
and stated his salary for the six years prior to trial.

Page 14 of

Appellant's Brief specifically provides "the court also found that Mr.
Colburn with his education and experience as a high level executive
in the insurance industry and an officer in the United States Navy had
acquired qualification skills to be transferred to different or other
fields of employment". Accordingly, there was not an omission as to
Mr. Colburn's past employment.
Transferability of Job Skills. The issue of transferability and
marketability of job skills was also addressed as evidenced by the
above quoted language. Further, page 15 of Appellant's Brief contains
the actual dialogue between the court and Connie Romboy regarding the
issue of transferability of job skills with a statement by Ms. Romboy
that she specifically looked at two areas for transferability, those
being the areas of marketing and public relations manager and
management consultant.

Appellant's Brief then cited Mrs. Romboy's

testimony regarding the salary range for both a public relations
manager and a management consultant.
Employment with VEMCO or outside of Aviation Industry. Contrary
to the allegations set forth in Respondent's Brief, Mr. Colburn was
not offered the job of heading up the commercial department of VEMCO.
11

(p.3 supra)

Further, paragraph 7 of Appellant's Statement of Facts

and page 17 of Appellant's Brief refer to Mr. Colburn receiving job
offers of $13,000 and $23,000 per year which were rejected.
Failure to Consider other Career Opportunities Including a Pilot
and other Areas of Financial Planning.

Page 16-17 of Appellant's

Brief specifically addresses Mrs. Romboy's testimony that Mr. Colburn
"has job skills and education which could be transferred to other
employment such as a co-pilot (average salary $28,000-$30,000)".
However, Mr. Colburn testified he has not flown an airplane for
fifteen years, does not currently have a valid medical, has eye sight
problems, does not have an A.P.P. rating, and companies are not hiring
50-year old pilots.

(Tr. 164-166, 190).

Appellant's Brief also included the prospect of Mr. Colburn
working for another financial planner and Ms. Romboy's testimony
relating to salaries for a beginning financial consultant.

Page 17

of Appellant's Brief provides:
Mr. Colburn testified he could earn $10.00 per hour working
for another financial planner and Connie Romboy testified
that a beginning financial planning consultant would earn
$28,000 per year nationally or $26,600 in the State of
Utah.
Mr. Colburn adequately marshalled the evidence relating to the
issue

of

voluntary

underemployment

by

addressing

his

job

qualifications and work experience and the testimony of Connie Romboy
relating to the transferability

and marketability

obtained through his past employment.

of skills he

Accordingly, Respondent's

argument that Appellant's Brief fails to satisfactory marshall the
evidence is not well founded.
12

CONCLUSION
Mr. Colburn made a prudent business decision

to become a

certified financial planner because it was the best long-term job
opportunity available.
underemployment
imputed.

Accordingly, he is not underemployed and

is a statutory requirement before income can be

Should the Court determine that Mr. Colburn is voluntarily

underemployed, income should be imputed at a maximum of $26,600 per
year which is the trial testimony regarding the starting salary for
a financial planner.

There was no evidence presented regarding job

openings available to Mr. Colburn at a higher salary.
The trial court clearly abused its discretion in awarding alimony
whether or not income is imputed to Mr. Colburn.

Alimony may only

raise the standard of living of the receiving spouse until it is
roughly equal to that of the paying spouse.

As evidenced by the

disproportionate expenses of the parties, Mrs. Colburn's standard of
living is substantially higher than that of Mr. Colburn1s without an
alimony award.
Adequate

evidence

was

introduced

at

trial

to

support Mr.

Colburnfs contention that his Navy retirement is determined by a point
system and the point system is the proper method to use in allocating
his retirement benefits between the parties.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of December_^JL995.

. Christiansen
& CHRISTIANSEN, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

13

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Reply Brief, were delivered to John B. Anderson, Attorney
for Plaintiff and Respondent, 623 East Firsts-South, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84147-0643, on this 1st day of Dec^mbc

•ry L.\ Christiansen
Terry

14

